Standing Committee B

[Mr. Eric Illsley in the Chair]

Criminal Justice Bill

Motion made, and Question proposed, 
That the Order of the Committee [17th December] be amended as follows— 
 (1) in paragraph (3), by leaving out '34' and inserting '26'; 
 (2) after paragraph (3), by inserting— 
 '(3A) the proceedings on Clause 27 to 34 (so far as not previously concluded) shall be brought to a conclusion at 7 p.m. on Thursday 9th January 2003;' 
 (3) in paragraph (4), by leaving out '5.15 p.m.' and inserting '6.50 p.m.'.—[Mr. Heppell.]

Graham Allen: I support the motion, which underlines how important the Bill is for policing. I also want to take this opportunity to mention a very sad event that occurred in my constituency. Yesterday, a police dog-handler and his dog were dragged along by the car of a joyrider that they were trying to apprehend, and the officer is in a critical, indeed life-threatening, condition. Brave officers such as he serve our communities and they will be looking to the Committee to ensure that the Bill is something of which we can all be proud.

Eric Illsley: I am sure that the hon. Gentleman carries the whole Committee with him.
 Question put and agreed to.

Clause 14 - Appeals to High Court

Hilary Benn: I beg to move amendment No. 40, in
clause 14, page 10, line 3, after 'bail)' insert— 
 '(a) after ''Where'' there is inserted ''(a)'', and 
 (b)'

Eric Illsley: With this we may discuss Government amendments Nos. 41 to 43.

Hilary Benn: Before I discuss the amendments, I want to echo your concern, Mr. Illsley, about the circumstances described by my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham, North (Mr. Allen). I am sure that the Committee's best wishes go to the officer and his family.
 Amendments Nos. 40 and 41 are simple drafting amendments, which are designed to make the provision amended by clause 14(1) easier to understand. 
 Amendment No. 42 provides that the High Court is to have no power—I think that the Committee accepted at the end of our previous deliberations that the change proposed in the clause was generally welcome—to entertain bail applications in cases where the Crown court makes a bail decision under the new powers in clauses 75 and 76, which relate to the retrial 
 of serious offences. That situation would not be covered by the abolition of the High Court's bail jurisdiction under clause 14(3), which necessarily refers only to existing powers. 
 Amendment No. 43 is a drafting amendment, which is primarily designed to take account of the reference to the revocation of bail in clauses 75 and 76. 
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Amendments made: No. 41, in 
clause 14, page 10, line 4, after 'and' insert '(b)'.
 No. 42, in 
clause 14, page 10, line 19, at end insert— 
 '(4A) The High Court is to have no power to entertain an application in relation to bail where the Crown Court— 
 (a) has granted or withheld bail, or 
 (b) has varied the conditions of bail, 
 under section 75 or 76 of this Act.'
 No. 43, in 
clause 14, page 10, line 29, at end insert— 
 '(7) Any reference in this section to the withholding of bail is to be read as including a reference to the revocation of bail.'—[Hilary Benn.]
 Clause 14, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 15 - Appeals by prosecution

Dominic Grieve: I beg to move amendment No. 26, in
clause 15, page 10, line 37, after 'imprisonment', insert 
 'for two years or more'.
 First, I associate myself with the Minister's response to the information given to us by the hon. Member for Nottingham, North. We all send our best wishes to the officer and his family. 
 The clause amends the Bail (Amendment) Act 1993. Under the clause, it will be possible for the prosecution to appeal not only in the case of an offence that is punishable by imprisonment for five years or more but in the case of any imprisonable offence. 
 When I saw the words ''Bail (Amendment) Act 1993'' in the Bill, it brought back memories—I drafted that legislation, having been asked for help by the hon. Member who was introducing it as a private Member's Bill. I had never drafted a piece of legislation before, and might never do again. Since it appeared on the statute book, the Court of Appeal has criticised its drafting on a number of occasions and it has been tinkered around with several times. That drafting was done by my fireside with a whisky in one hand and a pen in the other, quite late at night, when I came back from my barrister's practice, but at least it has stood the test of time and the Government seek to improve it—or do they? 
 When the 1993 Act was drafted, I felt that it would be pushing it a bit to say that it should be possible for the prosecution to appeal what it considered to be a mistaken decision to grant bail in respect of any imprisonable offence. That is why that was confined to offences attracting a sentence of imprisonment of five 
 years or more. This probing amendment prompts us to consider, as a topic for discussion, whether we are going too far in including any offence punishable by imprisonment. While I accept that discretion will lie with the prosecution, we could end up with a situation in which grants of bail in offences in which the likely sentence of imprisonment is going to be minute or non-existent could be appealed. That is why I have tabled an amendment that introduces a two-year limit. It is important for the Committee to consider the matter, and I shall be interested to hear the Minister's response. 
 We do not wish to see people out on the streets who have been wrongly granted bail by magistrates courts; that is why the 1993 Act seemed to be such an important tool. Prior to that, there was no possibility of any appeal by the prosecution against what the police might have felt was a mistaken decision to grant bail. However, it was always thought that it would be used in respect of serious offences, or of a person on trial for a serious offence. What is now proposed is a catch-all that could apply to anyone and would cover a vast number of offences. Do we need to go that far? There is a merit in having certainty in legal proceedings. Apart from the danger of clogging up the courts, if legislation results in people constantly thinking that decisions by magistrates to grant bail might be reversed a few weeks later, is it necessary? That is the key test in our deliberations on the Bill, and I should like the Minister to explain why the current wording is necessary.

Hilary Benn: I congratulate the hon. Gentleman on enlightening the Committee as to his role in the drafting of the original legislation. In the case of this clause—I cannot promise to do it in other cases—where he led, the Government are proposing to follow. I recognise that his is a probing amendment and he asks a legitimate question. The nature of the amendment accepts the case for some change to the five-year limit. We are relying on the consideration that Sir Robin Auld gave to the matter in his report.
 Sir Robin referred to the sorts of offences, not especially serious in themselves, that, if repeated, can affect the quality of life of large numbers of people, and give rise to concern about the inability of the criminal justice system to prevent the commission of offences on bail. Minor criminal damage is an example. Offences of that kind are currently excluded, and would also be excluded by the amendment. 
 Taking the argument that the hon. Gentleman advanced in favour of clarity, I tell him that the clause makes it clear that in relation to all offences that might attract a sentence of imprisonment, there would be a prosecution right of appeal. Despite that, however, it would not be usual for the prosecution to appeal against a grant of bail for a defendant charged with a minor offence. However, there will occasionally be circumstances in which it is appropriate to challenge a decision to grant bail—even for those offences punishable by less than two years' imprisonment, as detailed by the hon. Gentleman's amendment. It is 
 sensible and right for the prosecution to have a right of appeal against a grant of bail by magistrates for all cases that would be punishable by imprisonment. The Crown Prosecution Service's internal guidance, which gives advice on the operation of the right of appeal as currently constituted under legislation, would need to be revised to take account of the change proposed under the clause.

Dominic Grieve: I am grateful to the Minister for his exposé of the Government's reasoning, which seems totally coherent. In view of that and of the CPS guidelines in particular—which would, I hope, avoid ping-ponging, with the courts being cluttered up with applications on relatively minor cases—I shall withdraw the amendment.
 I say in passing that the provisions raise the prospect of further increasing the prison population. Given that the Government are now sending out mixed signals as to whether burglars should be imprisoned for first-time offences, a situation whereby those who have committed minor offences of criminal damage are kept in custody might lead the public to think that some of our priorities are slightly skewed. However, I accept that some instances of relatively minor criminal damage, especially if persistently committed by those out on bail, are exceptionally antisocial, and are good grounds for withdrawing bail. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Simon Hughes: I am supportive of the principle behind the clause. However, I have a question about the time scale. The clause refers to a two-part process: the granting of bail and the prosecution's appeal. If the prosecution appealed, would bail not be granted until the appeal was heard—that is, would the appeal act as a stay? The question raises an important issue, because if so, a court that had decided that there should be conditions of bail would have its decision overridden without the High Court's having a review to change that. The issue touches on an important principle, in terms of liberty and who eventually has the decision. The argument does not apply in the other direction, in the case of the person who is inside. On the traditional defence appeal for bail in cases in which the lower court has refused it, the old position properly stands until it is reversed. Therefore, there is no liberty question.

Dominic Grieve: I hope that the Minister can reassure the hon. Gentleman, unless the Act has been tinkered with since I drafted it. The appeal acts as a stay, though there are tight time limits on the bringing of the appeal.

Simon Hughes: That is the substantive question that I wanted to clarify, which is important, not least for the reason alluded to by the hon. Gentleman, with his previous—and present—life in mind, that the prisons should not be filled with extra people during the process of appeal. I would like the Minister to confirm what the time limits are, so that people who read our
 proceedings will know. What statistics from the Lord Chancellor's Department are available to the Minister on what the time scale is in practice? It is important that the process be instantaneous.
 Lastly, if the procedure is to be changed, so that it goes from the lower courts to the Crown court, as opposed to the High Court, a view that I generally support, there is no reason why, on every working day—by which I mean every working day of the year, every non-bank or public holiday and not on Saturdays or Sundays, rather than every legally termed working day of the year—the Crown court should not be able to deal with all the cases on that matter that all the magistrates courts within its area dealt with the previous day. 
 I should like a reassurance that someone to whom a magistrates court grants bail on a Friday, only for the prosecution to indicate that it wants to appeal, will know that the appeal will be dealt with on the next working day.

Hilary Benn: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his questions. I take his final point about what he regards as effective operating practice. On his first point, who am I to gainsay the person who played a part in drafting the original legislation? I am happy to confirm that what the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) said in his intervention is indeed the case.
 The 1993 Act requires the prosecution to indicate immediately that it intends to appeal. That appeal must be heard, in answer to the substantive question, within 48 hours. It is not quite the 24 hours that the hon. Gentleman mentioned in his final point. However, that does show that the time limits are tight. On his point about statistics, I do not know the answer to that question, but I shall make some inquiries and write to him.

Simon Hughes: I am grateful, but I seek one final clarification. If the 48-hour rule is invariable—I am tempted to say that matters of Government policy are invariable one day and the next are subject to exceptional measures—I presume that it would mean that if bail were granted on a Friday and the prosecution indicated that it would appeal, that appeal would be dealt with on the Sunday by the latest, if the Government really mean 48 hours and not 48 hours in working days. What would it mean were bail granted on Christmas eve? I ask so that people know where they stand. Is it a 48-hour rule or a 48-hour rule that does not take account of weekends and public holidays?

Hilary Benn: If I inadvertently mislead the Committee, I shall write to the hon. Gentleman to correct him. However, I believe that it is the latter consideration, because I am not aware that the courts sit on Sundays to consider prosecution appeals against the grant of bail.
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 15 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 16 - Drug users: restrictions on bail

Graham Allen: I beg to move amendment No. 100, in
clause 16, page 11, line 24, after 'conducted' insert 'in premises notified by the Secretary of State in pursuance of subsection (6C)(a) above'.

Eric Illsley: With this it will be convenient to take the following amendments: No. 101, in
clause 16, page 11, line 25, leave out 'suitably' and insert 'medically'.
 No. 102, in 
clause 16, page 11, line 25, leave out 'suitably qualified person' and insert 'person who is medically qualified or is possessed of a qualification recognised by practitioners licensed to give any form of treatment to persons dependent on Class A drugs, using only procedures which are recognised by such practitioners.'.
 Government amendment No. 52.

Graham Allen: I have three questions for the Minister in order to help us understand the clause. What specialist facilities do the Government have in mind for the assessments? Who do the Government propose should carry out those assessments? What do the Government mean by their proposed assessment?

Hilary Benn: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his probing amendment. It gives me the opportunity to tell the Committee that it is important that suitably qualified personnel carry out the assessment of offenders. I am sure that all Committee members agree with that. That is the purpose of Government amendment No. 52, which will allow the Secretary of State, from time to time, to specify the necessary qualifications or experience to undertake such an assessment.
 Members will appreciate that assessment does not involve the provision of drug treatment. Rather, it is designed to identify the offender's needs and develop a comprehensive care plan. For that reason, to undertake an assessment does not require the assessor to have a medical qualification. Although it is important for the assessment to be carried out in appropriate premises, the availability of accommodation will vary from area to area. We do not wish to restrict the location of assessments to specific premises in each area. However, we do intend to provide guidance to those areas where the powers are introduced. That guidance will set out the types of premises that will be suitable to undertake an assessment under clause 16.

Graham Allen: With those reassurances, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

John Mann: I beg to move amendment No. 146, in
clause 16, page 11, line 30, leave out 'assistance or'.
 This small amendment has behind it a major question on drugs treatment. At our last sitting, I raised the over-dominance of the probation service on matters relating to drugs treatment. The phrase ''assistance or treatment'' is not accidental, but it is wrong. The notion that a drug addict or person with a propensity to misuse specified class A drugs can be ''assisted'' without being treated is a misnomer. 
 One of the recommendations that I have made, both locally and to the Government, is that there be an expansion of supported tenancies. That is the sort of assistance that should be given. The idea that someone with a health problem can be given a supported tenancy without the health problem being treated is a highly dangerous notion. Over recent years, it has led to the cycle of offenders not being treated—and, crucially, their being given alternatives to treatment that do not work. It provides a suitable excuse for the drugs treatment services not treating people's health problems. It is one of the major problems in drugs treatment, and it is a cop-out. 
 If I have a health problem, I would expect it to be treated as such. A series of additional factors may be involved—for example, I may be or may have been homeless, or I might have been abused at home, either as a child or an adult. It is right that a multi-agency approach should be taken.

Paul Stinchcombe: I am following my hon. Friend's argument with great interest. I agree with him but I wonder whether, given the additional assistance that many of those people will need, a more appropriate amendment might not delete the words ''assistance or'' but replace the word ''or'' with the word ''and''.

John Mann: If that is what the Bill had stated, I would not have needed to table the amendment. In my view, the definition of treatment needs to be considered. If an amendment was tabled that replaced the word ''or'' with the word ''and'', the points that I am making would be suitably dealt with. It is crucial, however, that we go beyond the framing of the legislation and consider how it is put into practice. We must get away from the notion that it is acceptable that people with a drug dependency can be given assistance that does not include treatment for their health problem. If the word ''or'' was replaced with the word ''and'', or if the definition of treatment incorporated other forms of assistance such as supported tenancies, I would be happy; but I am most unhappy with the existing phrase, which allows the option for non-treatment. I wait to hear what the Minister has to say.

Hilary Benn: I have listened with care to my hon. Friend. It is clear that, in many circumstances, individuals with drug misuse problems require support or help other than clinical intervention. As my hon. Friend just acknowledged, that support may include the provision of a range of counselling options to address social problems underlying drug use, such as housing and employment problems, or it may include other therapies. My hon. Friend asked what constitutes treatment. The straight answer is that a range of treatments will be available to address the underlying cause, and it is our intention that a wide range of effective interventions should be available, because my hon. Friend is right that that is what matters in dealing with drug use. We want to maintain flexibility in this area so that the most appropriate follow-up in the circumstances can be offered to any individual.
 The clause makes it clear that we do not intend to rule out assistance or treatment, especially bearing in mind my point about flexibility. We certainly intend to take up that point in guidance, because we do not want to put a court in the position of having to choose between one or the other. We want both. I undertake to reflect a little further on the point that my hon. Friend raised to ensure that we have the clause entirely right, but our intention is clear. Perhaps we can deal with the issue in guidance, and if it would be helpful, I undertake to write to my hon. Friend, following further reflection, on the important points that he raised.

John Mann: In the light of the assurances given, and the fact that we shall have another opportunity to discuss the matter in relation to clause 179—along with another seven amendments, which I am sure the civil servants will want to look at because some address the same issue—I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Amendment made: No. 52, in 
clause 16, page 11, line 37, at end insert— 
 '(6F) In subsection (6E)(a) above, ''suitably qualified person'' means a person who has such qualifications or experience as are from time to time specified by the Secretary of State for the purposes of this subsection.'.—[Hilary Benn.]

Hilary Benn: I beg to move amendment No. 53, in
clause 16, page 11, line 38, leave out '3A' and insert '3A(3)'.

Eric Illsley: With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments Nos. 54, 55, 57 and 58.

Hilary Benn: We propose some purely technical amendments to ensure that references in the clause are precise. At a bail hearing, the court should consider whether a defendant falls within the provisions of the clause and thus whether a presumption against bail should apply. Only after having so deliberated should the court consider the circumstances, set out in current legislation, in which a defendant may be refused bail.
 There may well be cases in which a person caught in possession of class A drugs is charged only with the more serious offence of possessing those drugs with intent to supply. In such a case, the person may not be charged solely with possession and would not fall within the clause's provisions. The changes seem sensible, therefore, to cover that eventuality. 
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Amendments made: No. 54, in 
clause 16, page 11, line 39, leave out '(6E)' and insert '(6F)'.
 No. 55, in 
clause 16, page 11, line 41, at end insert— 
 '( ) the existing text of paragraph 2 is to be subparagraph (1) of that paragraph, and after that subparagraph (as so renumbered) there is inserted— 
 ''(2) If the defendant falls within paragraph 6B below, the court shall determine whether or not it is satisfied as mentioned in paragraph 6A below before turning (if it is so satisfied) to this paragraph.'','. 
 —[Hilary Benn.]

Simon Hughes: I beg to move amendment No. 140, in
clause 16 page 11, line 44, leave out from 'below' to end of line 48 and insert 
 'in deciding whether a defendant who falls into paragraph 6B below should be granted bail, the court shall give particular weight to the fact that the defendant failed to comply with the condition set out in paragraph 6B(2) below'.

Eric Illsley: With this it will be convenient to take the following amendments: No. 116, in
clause 16 page 11, line 45, leave out 'not' and insert 'only'.
 No. 117, in 
clause 16 page 11, line 45, leave out 'unless' and insert 'if'.

Simon Hughes: At present, clause 16(4) refers to schedule 1 and seeks to insert an
''Exception applicable to drug users in certain areas''
 when granting bail. Paragraph 6A reads: 
''Subject to paragraph 6C below, a defendant who falls within paragraph 6B below may not be granted bail unless the court is satisfied that there is no significant risk of his committing an offence while on bail; but this does not require the court, if so satisfied, to grant bail (disregarding other conditions)''.
 The thinking should be that if certain conditions are met, there will be no bail unless the court is persuaded by the person or by their advocate that there is no significant risk of his committing an offence. That does not necessarily mean that bail should be granted; other factors must be taken into account. 
 The considerations are set out in paragraph 6B(1): 
''A defendant falls within this paragraph if—
(a) he is aged 18 or over;
(b) a sample taken—
(i) under section 63B of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (testing for presence of Class A drugs) in connection with the offence; or
(ii) under section 145 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (drug testing after conviction of an offence but before sentence),
has revealed the presence in his body of a specified Class A drug;
(c) either the offence is his having possession of any specified Class A drug contrary to section 5(2) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, or the court is satisfied that there are substantial grounds for believing—
(i) that misuse by him or any specified Class A drug caused or contributed to the offence; or
(ii) (even if it did not) that the offence was motivated wholly or partly by his intended misuse of such a drug;
 Paragraph 6B(2)(a) states the condition that 
(a) a relevant assessment has been offered to the defendant but he does not agree to undergo it; or 
 (b) he has undergone a relevant assessment, and relevant follow-up has been proposed to him, but he does not agree to participate in it.
 It will be obvious to colleagues that the issue is whether there should be a presumption of bail or no such presumption or whether we should in these circumstances change the constitutional position that assumes that defendants are entitled to bail. Many have expressed their concerns, to the Government and to me, that this could be in breach of our obligations under the European convention on human rights, as it reverses the rules on considering the burden of 
 evidence when granting bail. It raises concerns under article 8 of the convention, which states that 
''Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life''.
 I would be grateful to hear from the Minister whether the Government have considered the possible breaches of article 8 that paragraph 6A may constitute and why they consider that it does not breach it. 
 Paragraph 6A is constitutionally interesting in that it is a presumption that will apply only if certain facilities are available. Unless they are available, the arrangement is not triggered. It is dependent—given that the Government have accepted that there is not universal provision across the country—on the accidental coincidence of the location of the court where the person appears and the treatment facilities. There is therefore a question of principle. 
 If I were arrested and charged with an offence that came into the category in question, and a bail issue arose, should I be treated differently because of an accident of geography, depending on whether I was being dealt with by Camberwell, Tonbridge or Leeds magistrates court? It seems to me that there is an unfair and arbitrary change of presumption. Bail might be more likely to be granted to one person than another simply because facilities were available in one place and not elsewhere. That raises the issue of inequality.

Paul Stinchcombe: I am struggling to follow the argument that the provision establishes a presumption. It seems to me that it simply imposes a condition. Can the hon. Gentleman conceive of circumstances in which a court would grant bail to a person even though it was satisfied that there was a significant risk of their committing an offence?

Simon Hughes: I am exploring the question of what presumption is being made. It seems to me a perfectly proper question. Given that the new paragraph 6A of schedule 1 to the 1976 Act is entitled
''Exception applicable to drug users in certain areas'',
 and that it provides that there will be an exception to the presumption, I take it that a change is being made to the presumption. That is what the Bill states.

Paul Stinchcombe: I just wonder whether the hon. Gentleman could answer the specific question that I asked. Can he conceive of any circumstances in which a court that was satisfied that there was a significant risk of someone committing an offence would grant bail?

Simon Hughes: Obviously, the court must weigh up the balance of the interests with respect to the community, and my presumption would be that it would take into account, perfectly properly, significant risk of further offending. My experience is that when the courts encounter that issue they do not give bail. That is the motivating criterion: no court that I have attended, when confronted with a significant likelihood of the person before it reoffending, grants bail. I agree with the hon. Gentleman's implication that logically, if there is significant risk, the court will not grant bail. A court would not do that now. That is not what is being changed.

Paul Stinchcombe: If that is the hon. Gentleman's position, why does he want to delete the relevant words from the new paragraph?

Simon Hughes: Because if the hon. Gentleman reads the amendment he will see that it provides that a decision as to whether to grant bail should be made giving particular weight to the conditions on drug compliance, without making them overriding.
 I am perfectly happy to retain the presumption in law that someone who presents a significant risk of continuing to offend while on bail should not get bail. My question for Ministers is whether it should be a precondition that the person should agree to and comply with the relevant procedures, given that they will, first, change the presumption that I have been talking about, and secondly, be unequal in their effect. Should not every bail application be considered on its merits? A number of factors are weighed, and the court must be given the discretion to decide whether the presumption should be discharged. Without any legislative change, the presumption that one begins with is that people should be given bail, but if there are reasons why they should not, the presumption is dislodged. 
 A considerable number of people believe that drug users will have to agree to undertake drug treatment to avoid being remanded in custody. I think that the Committee agrees that it is desirable for people to receive effective drug treatment. We talked about intervention on Tuesday, and I am up for the idea of easier and earlier intervention. In reality, however, any proposal in law will be relatively worthless if the facilities are not in place, and we shall come to that in the clause stand part debate. The Select Committee on Home Affairs considered the issue and said that the big question was what facilities were available and where they were. There is therefore an argument for saying that the proposed sanction, which involves the loss of liberty, will force on us a policy that is unequal in its application and for which facilities are not generally available. The Minister may want to touch on that, although he may want to reserve his points about the availability of treatment and to answer the questions raised by the Home Affairs Committee when he responds to the clause stand part debate.

Dominic Grieve: The hon. Gentleman has raised an important issue, and he may be aware that amendments Nos. 116 and 117 also probe it. Before I discuss them, however, I should say that I am inclined to disagree with his point about different treatment being provided in different parts of the country. I understand the point, but what he describes already happens. For instance, whether someone gets bail often depends on whether a place is available for them in a bail hostel, and that will vary from part of the country to another. If the hon. Gentleman wants to take his point further, he will have to show that the provisions institutionalise that difference, but I am not sure that they do.
 However, I entirely agree with the hon. Gentleman's important point about presumptions. We are altering the basic presumption in such cases, which was clearly set out in section 4 of the Bail Act 1976. The Act states: 
''A person to whom this section applies shall be granted bail except as provided in schedule 1 to this Act''.
 The exception in the Bill is very general. It pertains not to the nature of the offence but to matters that, on any showing, the Government see as related to the likelihood of someone committing a further offence. I do not disagree with that approach, but in many respects those matters fall outside the immediate scope of the offence. I do not want to put a spoke in the Government's wheels as they try to achieve their objective. Indeed, I share that objective, and I accept that there will be a continuing risk of habitual drug users committing burglary offences unless action is taken. However, I question whether it is necessary to draft paragraph 6A in such a peculiarly draconian fashion to achieve that objective. 
 A defendant covered by paragraph 6B 
''may not be granted bail unless''
 the court believes that there is no significant risk, but such a provision is not required. Amendment No. 116 would remove the word ''not'' and insert ''only'', while amendment No. 117 would leave out ''unless'' and insert ''if''. That may appear to be an exercise in semantics, but the Bill would be more likely to survive a challenge under the Human Rights Act 1998—the hon. Gentleman touched on that—if it were amended along the lines that we propose. As drafted, it appears to place a prohibition on bail. That causes me some concern, and I shall be interested to hear the Minister's response. 
 Words matter when drafting. Heaven knows, we sometimes tinker about with just one word—to good effect, I hope. I am therefore a little startled that such a bald statement has been included in the Bill. It takes drug addicts outside the scope and protection of the Bail Act 1976 altogether. The Minister might want to reconsider the matter, while still trying to meet the objectives that most Committee members share.

Hilary Benn: I am grateful for the amendments. They give us the opportunity to get to the heart of the clause. I accept that the proposed change is fundamental and significant. The hon. Gentleman is entirely right: the clause alters the presumption. However, it does so in order to deal with a problem with which we are all familiar. If I had to give an instance that would advance the case for the clause, it would be the conversation that I had about three months ago with a young man who was in a bail hostel, awaiting trial for an offence that he had committed. He had been addicted to heroin for eight or nine years. Because he had had trouble in getting a prescription while he was in the hostel, he had been trying to steal from a store in the city centre. That conversation brought home to me very forcefully the extent to which the young man was imprisoned by his addiction. He could look no further than where the next fix was to come from, so he could look no further than the means by which he would acquire money to pay for it.
 I welcome the fact that Conservative spokespeople have recently emphasised the importance of addressing drug addiction and its impact on offending. That 
 demonstrates the broad consensus about the need to do something. The clause aims to tackle the problem in a way that involves a significant change in the arrangements.

Simon Hughes: The situation, which the Minister accepts requires a significant change in the law, is similar to that of people who are imprisoned by their own mental or psychological illness or another condition that involves liberty issues. The difficulty with his argument is that it would give different liberties to people with different conditions, whether self-induced or not.

Hilary Benn: I understand the hon. Gentleman's point. My response would be that such is the scale and nature of the suffering that drug addiction and the imprisonment of drug addicts causes—both to the addicts who are imprisoned and to the victims of the crimes that they commit—that it makes sense to try arrangements that do more than we currently do to break the cycle. Such arrangements are set out in the clause, and I am coming on to the pilot. I accept entirely that getting out of an addiction is a difficult thing to do. It is hard to offer help to somebody who might not want to take it. People have to want to change their lives; nobody underestimates the difficulty of change. However, that does not mean that we should not try to do something. It is a big social problem.
 The hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey (Simon Hughes) asked about ECHR compatibility. We have, of course, considered the compatibility of the provisions with the human rights convention. We are convinced that they comply, because the court retains the discretion to grant bail if satisfied that the offender will not commit offences while on bail. We are also happy that the clause contains a proportionate response to what is clearly a significant problem. 
 On the issue of inconsistency, which was the hon. Gentleman's second substantive point, he was well answered by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield: it is not unknown. We shall run a pilot. I accept entirely the arguments about the need for appropriate assessment, help and treatment, so we shall run the pilot in areas that can offer a practical response to the identification of drug problems. We need to learn from that process, and there is nothing wrong in doing that while trying to address that major problem. 
 It is a tough proposition for the offender. The provisions of the clause confront offenders with a choice—but they do have a choice, and consequences will flow from it. Our argument, in essence, is that we believe it to be a sensible and proportionate response to a serious problem.

Dominic Grieve: I am sorry to keep on picking on the Minister, but schedule 1 to the Bail Act 1976 lists the exceptions against the granting of bail. It states that bail need not be granted in certain circumstances, including failure to surrender to custody, committing an offence and interfering with witnesses. The provision that we are debating is totally dissimilar in nature and character from any exceptions listed in the Bail Act. In terms of the protection that the law
 affords them, it removes drug addicts into a completely different world. For that reason, I worry about the Bill's compatibility with the Human Rights Act.

Hilary Benn: I accept that the Bill creates a set of circumstances, which are the subject of the amendments, so I shall not argue with the hon. Gentleman's substantive point. We have clearly considered the matter of compatibility, and in the end all such things are tested in the courts. However, there is something particular about the nature of this problem, which all members of the Committee accept, that justifies our proposals. We are trying to do something sensible and practical about a major problem, which damages individuals and communities, but to do it in a way that offers a practical way forward—namely, the opportunity of assistance or treatment following assessment. It is not solely punitive: as well as imposing particular obligations on those with a class A drug problem, it is saying to them that they should avail themselves of what we are providing to support them while they are trying to get off that drug, and if they do not, other consequences may follow.

Simon Hughes: I understand the Minister's argument, but I do not accept it. That is the difference between socialists and liberals. It is fundamental. The Minister argues that it is for the good of society that the state should be able to curtail a person's liberty for a particular category of crime. I start from the presumption that all citizens have the right to liberty, and that it can be taken away only if it is perceived as being fair throughout society, done in a way that is equal and justified and done only in exceptional circumstances and with the most careful caveats.
 I accept that the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield would be better, because they avoid one of the problems of my amendment. I will be happy not to press my amendment to a vote, but I shall be reassured to think that when the time comes—a little later in our deliberations when the amendments fall to be debated—he will press his amendment to a Division, because I would support it. If the clause is not amended, at least as he proposes, I will not be able to vote for it; it has not been and could not be justified as grounds for changing the presumption. 
 The hon. Gentleman has offered the Committee a way that does not appear to take away the right of the court to decide that bail should be withheld if there is a significant risk of an offence being committed. It also deals with the point made by the hon. Member for Wellingborough (Mr. Stinchcombe) on the weakness of my amendment, which I accept. None the less, it sustains my argument about presumption.

Dominic Grieve: Just to be clear about this, would the hon. Gentleman be happy to vote for amendments Nos. 116 and 117?

Simon Hughes: Yes.

Dominic Grieve: I am grateful to him for confirming that.

Simon Hughes: On the substantive issue that motivates the Minister's proposition, I understand the concern, but I think that it would be met by the alternative formulation that starts from a presumption of bail being obtained. That would still give the courts the ability to do all the things that the Minister wants them to be able to do without either breaking the presumption or risking the possibility that certain people may be treated differently. I hope that I have made clear my concerns about the clause and I hope that colleagues, perhaps including some on the Labour Benches, will join me in voting to amend the clause as suggested in amendments Nos. 116 and 117.

Dominic Grieve: On a point of order, Mr. Illsley. When should I move those amendments? I am always slightly confused about when to move amendments other than the lead amendment, but I wish to put them to a vote.

Eric Illsley: Does the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey wish to withdraw amendment No. 140?

Simon Hughes: I seek you guidance, Mr. Illsley, as I want the Committee to have the opportunity to vote on amendments Nos. 116 and 117.

Eric Illsley: If the hon. Gentleman wishes to withdraw amendment No. 140, we can proceed to a Division on amendment No. 116. If amendment No. 116 falls, I am advised that it will not make any sense to move amendment No. 117.

Simon Hughes: I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Amendment proposed: No. 116, in 
clause 16, page 11, line 45, leave out 'not' and insert 'only'.—[Mr. Grieve.]
 Question put, That the amendment be made:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 5, Noes 15.

Question accordingly negatived.

Hilary Benn: I beg to move amendment No. 56, in
clause 16, page 12, line 13, leave out from 'is' to 'or' in line 15 and insert 
 'one under section 5(2) or (3) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 and relates to a specified Class A drug,'.
 This amendment is in the same vein as my previous amendment. There may well be cases in which a person caught in possession of a class A drug is charged only with the more serious offence of intent to supply. In such cases, the person would not be solely charged with possession and would not fall within the 
 provisions of the clause. The amendment would enable a presumption against bail to apply in the event that a person was charged only with the more serious offence of possession with intent to supply, whether or not that person was also charged with simple possession. 
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Amendments made: No. 57, in 
clause 16, page 12, line 23, at end insert 
 'or (if the court is considering on a second or subsequent occasion whether or not to grant bail) has been, and continues to be, satisfied.'.
 No. 58, in 
clause 16, page 12, line 47, leave out '8' and insert '8(1)'.—[Hilary Benn.]
 Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

Simon Hughes: Given my views on the matter that we have just debated I shall not be able to vote for the clause, but I want to explain to the Minister two substantive matters that were raised by the Home Affairs Committee, which said:
''Whether or not Clause 16 will work in practice is dependent on two things. First, the ability to enforce the bail condition and secondly, the availability of treatment, to which the bail condition relates. On the first point, the Association of Police Authorities have highlighted some potential problems. We were told that, in some pilot areas, a 'large percentage' of those who test positive for Class A drugs do not comply with drug treatment orders 'thus ending back in court for re-sentencing'.
We are accordingly concerned about the practicality of enforcing such conditions against drugs misusers who consent to the bail condition, but then fail to comply with the treatment. We look forward to hearing from the Home Office on this point.''
 I should be grateful if the Minister could make the Home Office's response to that. 
 The Select Committee report continued: 
''On the second point, we are pleased to note the provisions under Clause 16 will only apply in areas within which treatment is available. Therefore a person 'could not be refused bail simply on the basis that he had refused treatment where there was not treatment available'. As the Minister conceded, there is not enough treatment available at the moment. We were informed that in one police area there is an eight month waiting list for detainees willing to submit to treatment. The Minister informed us that, within the next few weeks, he would hope to set out his proposals as to 'where and when treatment will be available' for the purposes of clause 16.''
 I should be grateful if the Minister could update the Committee on the matter of where and when treatment is now, or will be, available for the purposes of clause 16. I do not know whether the Government deal with the information by way of a table showing police authority or magistrates court areas. I think that all members of the Committee would be interested to know in which areas treatment is available, and in which it is not. Colleagues involved in health matters would be interested too. 
 In any event, as it has not been possible to amend the clause now, I hope that the Government will reflect on the points that were made in the previous debate. I, together with, I am sure, our Conservative colleagues, would be happy, if the question arose of agreeing on a formulation, to work with the Government on an improved provision that would meet our objections.

David Cameron: As this is the first time that I have been able to speak in this Committee, I wish you and the Committee a happy new year, Mr. Illsley. I apologise for missing the sittings before Christmas. I was stuck in hospital. I have a son with severe epilepsy. I mention that because at home I have a large cabinet full of clobazam, phenobarbitone and temazepam, which are all now class C drugs—not only that, but possession of them illegally is an arrestable offence. I reassure the Minister that when I go out with them I shall be careful to take the prescription with me.
 I am glad to be on this Committee, because I am also a member of the Home Affairs Committee. We tried to conduct some pre-legislative scrutiny of the Bill, although that was difficult, because it was not published a long time in advance. I thoroughly approve of the clause and the intention behind it. As my vote on the previous amendment showed, I am not particularly concerned about the reversal of the presumption about bail. The Home Affairs Committee examined the issue and stated that the clause 
''will also create a presumption against bail if the defendant refuses to agree to undergo any assessment or treatment that is offered.''
 It continued: 
''As we understand it, the purpose is not simply to extend the grounds for refusing bail . . . but to encourage Class A drug users to undergo treatment.''
 I say amen to that—that is the point of the clause. 
 On the issue of drugs, the report boils down to one or two points: focus on the 250,000 to 300,000 serious drug users, and get them into treatment as quickly as possible. We all know the figures. Class A drug users carry out 50 per cent. of property crimes. Every other time one's car is broken into or one's house is burgled, it is likely to be by someone addicted to class A drugs. The health problems are also huge. Some 300,000 people have hepatitis C through intravenous drug use, and approximately one third of them will probably die prematurely. Anything that gets addicts into treatment will not only cut crime but save a large number of lives. 
 The clause helps because it says that if one has committed an imprisonable offence, or has been accused of doing so, and one then either refuses a drug test or fails one yet does not accept treatment, one cannot get bail. I think that I have got that right. The clause is one of the most complexly drafted. The Minister and the draftsmen should always aim to draft legislation like Ronseal—it should do exactly what it says on the tin. One has to read the clause several times, and thank God for the explanatory notes, which make it clearer. I notice that the aim of amendment No. 103, tabled by hon. Member for Nottingham, North, is to clarify whether certain provisions in clause 17 mean what the explanatory notes say. I thoroughly agree with that.

Simon Hughes: Some of us batter away endlessly on that issue, particularly on criminal justice legislation. I support the hon. Gentleman thoroughly, and hope that his reminder of how awful the clause is might allow Ministers to replace the original. Instead of
 having to marry the original with the amendments, one could simply say, ''Delete A, put in B.'' Whatever we agree B should be, it is at least in one place, where one can find, read and understand it.

David Cameron: The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right that because the clause is an amendment to the Bail Act 1976 the conclusion comes before the argument. The clause starts by saying what the Secretary of State has to state before saying what the clause is designed to achieve.
 As the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey said, the Home Affairs Committee pointed out the key to the clause's working. The explanatory notes state: 
''The provision can only apply in areas where appropriate assessment and treatment facilities are in place.''
 The question concerns not only resources and money but priorities. The Home Affairs Committee found that for every £1 one spends on treatment, one is likely to save some £3, in terms of prevention, policing and other matters. On that issue, we can make an impact in reducing drug abuse and drug-related crime, and saving lives. I am glad that my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Mr. Letwin) and my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield have made the issue such a priority for the Conservative party. 
 My plea to the Minister is that we should not be too prescriptive about the type of treatment or assistance—I think that he said that in his opening remarks. The hon. Member for Bassetlaw (John Mann) spoke about that issue in earlier debates. Everyone that I have spoken to who has gone through drug rehabilitation says that different courses work for different people. For some people, though a methadone scrip does not get them off their addiction to opiates, it gives them time to think about things and rebuild their lives. For other people, it must be the 12-step programme, the complete rebuilding of one's life at some hideous residential centre in the middle of the downs, where ones pulls oneself apart and puts oneself back together again. For others, the solution might be something completely different. 
 A drugs worker in south London put the issue to me in a good way. He said, ''It's a bit like diets. Anyone who's successfully done a diet''—one can tell that I have not done so—''will tell you that the one they did is the only way to do it.'' If that person did the F-plan diet, he or she will say that that is the only one that works. If it was a fibre-only diet, or whatever, he or she will explain its brilliance. It is the same with getting off drugs. The individuals for whom it has worked become messianic about how good it was for them. However, they should not become too prescriptive—let a thousand flowers bloom if possible. 
 Why do we apply the clause to over-18s only? I noticed in some of the Bill's earlier provisions that we are saying that because some of the drug treatment and testing order-type stuff has started to work we should start to apply it to children aged 14, 15 and 16. Why can we not do the same here? It seems that it is important to get treatment for people who have an addiction and who are in court accused of offences. 
 The more that can be done to concertina that approach and save time, the better. We should not have to wait until people are 18. 
 I am so supportive of doing that because it brings together addiction and treatment. I had a very interesting meeting with Chief Superintendent Love in Oxford, which is near my constituency. He wanted to go further than the Government suggest. I put this suggestion to the Minister for consideration. Chief Superintendent Love asked why entering treatment could not be a condition of police bail, rather than just bail being available only when an individual goes to court. I know that problems would arise because the person would not yet have gone before a legal body. However, if we are trying to ensure that the addict enters treatment as quickly as possible, we must realise that for every day of delay between arrest and a court appearance, that person is still addicted, still must steal to fund a drug habit and still commits crimes—and is still at risk of self-harm or even death. 
 I ask the Minister to see whether he can do anything to reduce the age of persons who can appear in court and whether anything can be done earlier at the police bail stage. Otherwise, the Bill is absolutely right, and I look forward to supporting it.

Dominic Grieve: In welcoming the presence on the Committee of my hon. Friend the Member for Witney (Mr. Cameron), I wish to say much of the same. This clause will potentially be important. Since we consider drug addiction to be a major cause of crime, we support finding a device to tackle it, and I welcome the clause.
 I have a slight difference with my hon. Friend about drafting: I would stick to the preference of my earlier amendment, because it is important that the clause stand up to legal scrutiny. Above all, I do not want us to waste time on legal challenges—I want the clause to work smoothly and effectively. Even at this late stage, I put in a plea to the Minister, when he leaves with his officials, to review the drafting. My hon. Friend rightly pointed out that the clause is complex. The amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Nottingham, North made that clear also. 
 The clause tries to insert into the Bail Act 1976 something that its draftsman would not in a month of Sundays have imagined likely. That is one reason why it reads so inelegantly. As I said earlier, it is also contrary the entire thrust of the Bail Act. That may be a good thing in this particular exception, but in my limited experience of drafting Bills it is always wise to marry the amendments to an existing piece of legislation to the spirit of that legislation, if the same end can be achieved by doing so. 
 I hope that the Minister may ponder that when he leaves the Committee today and before we go any further. I doubt whether it will be revisited at some later stage, because it is ultimately, as he said, a matter that may be resolved in the courts. However, I want the clause to work, and to work effectively. I wish it well, because it is an important component in trying to tackle crime.

Hilary Benn: Let me deal with the two substantive points raised by the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey in relation to comments made in the Home Affairs Committee report. We shall respond to that report in due course. I accept the point made by the Select Committee about enforceability. That, and especially managing breach, is a matter of practicality. We shall have to learn from the experience of implementing criminal justice interventions, in particular in the high crime areas. Presumption against bail is part of a package of changes to the criminal justice system identified in the updated drugs strategy.
 I referred earlier to additional resources, but I accept the point of the hon. Member for Witney that it is not simply a question of resources. However, part of the answer to the reasonable questions that have been asked about whether the arrangements can work in practice is that we should ensure that the resources are available to provide appropriate treatment. So far as the areas are concerned, I am not in a position to give the list that he has asked for, but I undertake to write to the hon. Gentleman. I have also undertaken that we shall cover the matter in response to the Home Affairs Committee.

Simon Hughes: When are the Government expecting to respond to the Home Affairs Committee report? We are in the slightly complicated position that the Bill has been produced and scrutinised and suggestions have been made, but we are in Committee and have not had a response.

Hilary Benn: I am tempted to give the answer that my late mother always gave when we asked when supper would be. She said, ''When it's ready.'' That is the honest answer, and I shall attempt to give an indication in the letter that I have promised to send the hon. Gentleman in response to his very fair point.
 I welcome the contribution—in both senses, because it was his first—of the hon. Member for Witney. He helpfully reminded us of the Home Affairs Committee's support for the changes and set out most cogently the case for them. I am with him in the Ronseal camp. Having had discussions with parliamentary draftsmen, I know that there is a tension between the purity of wording and ensuring that it is spare and does not include anything that does not need to be there. That is useful one respect, but it does not always help lay people, myself included, to understand Parliament's intentions. Where these amendments are concerned, I acknowledge that, because the Bail Act has been amended a number of times, things are becoming complicated. We aim to consolidate when time allows.

Paul Stinchcombe: My hon. Friend mentioned the parliamentary draftsmen. Could he ask them, or others who advise him, whether there would be any difference in the interpretation of the clause if amendments Nos. 116 and 117 were made?

Hilary Benn: That is a very helpful intervention, because I have already asked the question. The advice I received was that it would make no difference. That is why I voted no—

Dominic Grieve: When we discussed those amendments, perhaps because he was concentrating on amendment No. 140, the Minister did not say that. I am grateful that he has said it now. I understand his argument, but I still think that the wording that I proposed was better.

Hilary Benn: I hear what the hon. Gentleman says. When I first read those amendments, I thought that they were further grammatical improvements. However, we shall let the matter rest.
 In response to the first of the three points raised by the hon. Member for Witney, I am 100 per cent. with him. It is an extremely sensible observation: we should not be too prescriptive. If something helps a person with a drug problem to get off it, we should try it. In relation to the under-18s, clause 10 is being piloted for those aged 14-plus. However, we recognise that there are differences in young people's needs and in the provision of effective treatment. The drug testing pilots will ensure that we have the evidence that we need to decide the most appropriate ways of intervening with the relevant age ranges.

David Cameron: My understanding is that clause 10 is about extending DTTOs to young people. What would be wrong with considering attaching conditions to young people's bail in the same way?

Hilary Benn: Clause 10 is about testing, not extending DTTOs to under-18s. Tests would be followed up by the provision of assessment and treatment for young people. The purpose of clause 10 is therefore different from what the hon. Gentleman thought.
 As regards police bail, I understand the motivation, but the difficulty is that there must be assessment if the clause is to work. It is rather hard to see how one could marry effective assessment with timely decisions on police bail. 
 Question put, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 14, Noes 1.

Question accordingly agreed to. 
 Clause 16, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 17 - Interpretation of Part 2

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Graham Allen: Interpretation clauses are normally pretty dry and boring, but it is important to put one
 point on the record. The Bill is not just for lawyers and judges but for everyone. Some of the debates between Front-Bench and Back-Bench colleagues from all parties have been very learned, and the lawyers among us have really got stuck in, but few people outside the House will understand much of what we have said. Indeed, there have been times when I have got lost, and I am sure that other non-lawyer colleagues have felt the same.
 Interpretation means getting across to people what the law means. The law is owned and used by people outside the House; it is not simply an issue for those involved with the courts in some capacity or another. Although the Minister will not be able to say much in his immediate response—I do not expect it to be lengthy—I urge him to take away with him the concept of making our law more comprehensible to the ordinary person and to end people's alienation from the criminal justice system. 
 We can all give examples of the problem as regards policing, but we are now considering how our courts interpret policy. I beg the Minister and his colleagues, during their tenure in government, to bear in mind the fact that that they are passing law to make people's lives better, so please will they explain what they are doing in terminology that ordinary police officers, probation officers and lay people can understand? We talk about Crown courts instead of regional criminal courts, magistrates courts instead of local courts, and stipendiaries and magistrates instead of local judges. We almost delight in making our criminal justice system obscure. That is particularly true in respect of clause 17. 
 The famous case of Pepper v. Hart allows the courts to use Hansard as a guide to interpreting the law in certain circumstances. Will my hon. Friend the Minister think about the suggestion that the explanatory notes, when carefully crafted, should be used to explain some of the more obscure legal concepts in the Bill? That would help everyone else to understand what we are doing here and what Parliament is doing on their behalf. It would save millions of pounds in court time and head off many expensive disputes. Perhaps I am too cynical about the legal profession, but that might be why we have not made as much progress as we should have done. Will he consider whether there is a better way of reconnecting with people outside? These are important issues, and we need the public to understand what we are doing.

Hilary Benn: As my hon. Friend will have detected from my comments to the hon. Member for Witney about what is described as the Ronseal approach, I have considerable sympathy for his point. My right hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor-General looks puzzled. Ronseal does exactly what it says on the tin. In other words, the wording is very clear. I undertake to write to my hon. Friend on that point. Here, we are having a clause stand part discussion, yet if someone wandered in and sat in the Public Gallery, they would wonder what we were up to. The language has developed from the way in which things were done in the past, but that does not mean that we should not constantly ask ourselves whether we are explaining
 things and legislating in a way that will allow the courts to make precise interpretations. In some cases, it is necessary for the language to be obscure, but we should always ask whether we are doing things in a way that helps people to understand the job that we are doing on their behalf.
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 17 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 18 - Conditional cautions

Simon Hughes: I beg to move amendment No. 141, in
clause 18, page 13, line 11, after 'caution', insert 
 'in respect of an offence and in lieu of criminal proceedings'.

Eric Illsley: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments:
 No. 142, in 
clause 18, page 13, line 16, after 'which', insert 
 'have been specified in the code of practice issued under section 21 below and'.
 No. 113, in 
clause 18, page 13, line 17, leave out 'either or'.
 No. 123, in 
clause 18, page 13, line 18, leave out 'ensuring or facilitating' and insert 'assisting towards'.

Simon Hughes: I welcome the Solicitor-General, who will respond to the debate on this important part of the Bill. She has been courteous in making herself available and letting us have supporting documents, as well as supportive of the idea of conditional cautions. I hope that she will consider the amendments in the same spirit, because we want the system to work well.
 The amendments relate to subsection (1), which states that people who are authorised—I shall return to who that is later— 
''may give a conditional caution to a person aged 18 or over''
 if certain requirements are met. Those requirements are set out in clause 19, which we shall come to. 
 The background to the amendment is that the use of cautions has declined because they have been regarded as less effective, often by police, and society at large regards them as inadequate. The amendment would build back in another stage of options. The caution simpliciter would be at the bottom of the league of those responses that count but do not put a person on the criminal justice ladder. Conditional cautions would give people a telling off and require them to do something as a result, and if they did not, certain consequences would follow. People are always shouting for bigger penalties and more effective remedies, and conditional cautions give us a range of such remedies. 
 Amendment No. 141—again, I am happy to discuss the drafting—seeks to make it clear that conditional cautions are in respect of an offence, but in place of 
 criminal proceedings. We talk about the criminal justice system being weighed down with paperwork, and the Solicitor-General and I have sat through too many meetings discussing the fact that there are not enough police in our borough, and we have the same discussion again this year. The problem arises partly because officers spend so much time doing paperwork, and I am keen to ensure that we do not lock everyone who needs to be rebuked into a long and bureaucratic criminal justice process. 
 People must be clear about the principle. We are talking about a way of getting people to undertake to behave themselves that does not involve giving them a criminal record. We must be careful about giving criminal records to people as they are growing up and going through a stage of challenging society, because they are not really criminals in the wider sense. Such people might get carried away after a 21st birthday party on a Friday night and, ideally, we should try to keep them out of the criminal justice system. That is what amendment No. 141 is about. It would make it clear that conditional cautions were to be used instead of, rather than as the first step in, criminal proceedings. 
 Amendment No. 142 would ensure that a code of practice set out the conditions that could be applied to a caution. They could be varied in the light of experience, but the range must be known in advance. They need not be so tightly defined as to be inflexible, and I am in favour of their being more widely defined where appropriate. However, Parliament should approve the range of conditions, which is the reason for the amendment.

Lady Hermon: Is it not essential that the code of practice explain the significance of an admission of guilt to a person before they sign one? It should be made clear that it is designed to keep them out of prison, but that it will be admissible as evidence in criminal proceedings if that person does not comply with the conditions.

Simon Hughes: I am extremely sympathetic, and I hope that the hon. Lady will support the thrust of amendment No. 142, which would ensure that we get the conditions and the document of bail right. If the document is used in court, it must have the appropriate authority and status.

Paul Stinchcombe: On a point of clarification, does the hon. Gentleman think that amendment No. 141 is necessary in the light of clauses 19(1) and 20(1), which seem to meet his concerns?

Simon Hughes: Well, I wondered whether we needed further clarification in clause 18(1)—I did not automatically presume that we did. The direct answer is that clauses 19(1) and 20(1) do not entirely meet my concerns, although they do by implication. The hon. Gentleman rightly asks us to pay attention to clause 20(1), which makes it clear that those who do not comply with conditions will become involved in criminal proceedings. My wish—this goes back to the point made by the hon. Member for Witney—is that we should be clear about the principles. We are discussing a process in which failure to comply will trigger a criminal offence that will go on someone's
 record. I am happy to work out a formulation that achieves that, but we should make clear up front what we are doing—it should not be hidden away. We all get waylaid by the styles employed by those who draft legislation, which change from time to time. Those involved obviously decided that the current drafting was the best way to proceed.
 In relation to amendment No. 142, Parliament should agree the conditions; in relation to amendments Nos. 113 and 123, I support probing whether both rehabilitation and reparation should be accepted as objectives. Our formulations must reflect the reality that no legislation can guarantee good behaviour; we can only live in hope. I am happy to support the amendments and to co-operate with Committee members to ensure that we follow the recommendations of Lord Justice Auld's review on the criminal courts. We should learn from the experience of other countries that show that this is a good path to follow.

Dominic Grieve: The hon. Gentleman introduced this clause, and it and clauses 20 and 21 are of great importance. It is a very sensible move; I am wholly in favour of conditional cautions, and this part of the Bill therefore merits careful scrutiny. The hon. Member for North Down (Lady Hermon) correctly said that it is important to ensure that people fully understand the consequences of consenting to cautions.
 I must tell the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey that I agree with the hon. Member for Wellingborough—I am unconvinced that his amendment is necessary, although I fully understand why he tabled it. The hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey correctly summarised the purpose of amendments Nos. 113 and 123. I have a slight concern arising from amendment No. 113 about whether it would be correct to allow a caution if it were only assisting towards one or other of the two goals but not both. I wish to hear the Minister's view. 
 A situation could arise in which it was acceptable to give a caution if it facilitated the rehabilitation of the offender but did not ensure that he made any reparation for the offence. Even odder, it would ensure that he made reparation for the offence without contributing to his rehabilitation. Surely the two go together. Why, therefore, has the ''either or'' been introduced? The purpose of amendment No. 113 is to delete these words. 
 Amendment No. 123 is to prevent us from getting carried away with our own rhetoric. We cannot ensure the rehabilitation of offenders; we can only hope to assist in the process. The Minister may even be able to accept amendment No. 123 because we cannot ''ensure'' that an offender will be rehabilitated. Therefore our amendment reflects reality and will amend clause 18 so that it does not sound foolish.

Harriet Harman: The hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey has explained exactly the purpose of ''Part 3 Conditional Cautions'' of the Bill. There are two possibilities at present if there is evidence that someone has committed an offence: prosecution or a caution. In many circumstances that works well. I may not wish to
 describe conditional cautions as a ''third way'', but that, in effect, is what they are trying to be. It is still part of the diversionary process to ensure that someone does not go further and deeper into the criminal justice system. It is a caution plus; a caution with a bit of extra bite. Of course, it does not block off the possibility of later prosecution, and some of the amendments deal with such issues. It could be that someone will admit to having committed an offence and that the authorities will not want to prosecute in the first instance but will consider a caution to be inadequate. A mechanism would be needed that did not remove the possibility of a caution but imposed conditions, meeting which would bring an end to the matter. The hon. Gentleman has explained the hierarchy better than I might have done, and I refer the Committee to his explanation. His amendments are probing in spirit; the principles are restorative and rehabilitative.
 I shall deal quickly with the point raised by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield. We can all think of circumstances in which prosecution would not be appropriate in the first instance but a caution would be inadequate. Something restorative would be a good condition. There might not be an appropriate rehabilitative programme for a particular offender, or it might be that rehabilitation is not the best response. Rehabilitation is key when restoration is not appropriate—so ''either or'' is probably right; we do not want to be too prescriptive. We want to enable conditional cautioning to be as useful as possible. That is why we want to leave open the choice between restoration and rehabilitation. 
 Amendment No. 141 would add 
''in respect of an offence'',
 which the hon. Gentleman acknowledges is already in subsection (2). However, it would also add 
''in lieu of criminal proceedings''.
 The object is right; people should realise that they will face criminal proceedings if they do not comply with the conditions and that is dealt with later in this part of the Bill, as my hon. Friend the Member for Wellingborough said. The danger of the amendment is that it might lead people to think that a conditional caution is just like an ordinary caution, in that it is instead of criminal proceedings. It might not be; so we do not want to give people the impression that if they agree to a conditional caution, it is in lieu of criminal proceedings. It is not; they might fail the conditions and find themselves being prosecuted. I agree with the spirit of the amendment, but its phrasing could be misleading. 
 Amendment No. 142 about the specification of the conditions in the code of practice breaches what we now know as the Witney principles. We want to illustrate as clearly as possible what we are trying to do so that we can be sure that people know and understand what we are aiming for. We want to give plenty of examples of what the conditions might be, but we do not want to inhibit people at local level if, in the face of a particular offence or offender, in the context of certain programmes, they can think of a condition that we have not thought of. We do not 
 want to hold back people's imagination and creativity. That is partly because the legislation has not been enacted, and we should not try to anticipate all the conditions before the scheme gets going. 
 Even if it were possible to have a longer code of practice later on, when we saw how the scheme worked, it would not be appropriate now. It would also make the code of practice very long. If we had to envisage every condition that might be applied to assist with restoration or rehabilitation, it would be an enormous volume. It would probably be wrong because it would block off local creativity, but it might also be unworkable in practice if one had to specify all the conditions in the code of practice, as amendment No. 142 would have us do.

Simon Hughes: What would be the remedy for someone who thought that the condition imposed was unreasonable but because of the situation they signed up to it? How do we ensure that people do not impose conditions that might sound like a brilliant idea but are actually unreasonable because they are undeliverable?

Harriet Harman: To make this work, the conditions have to be reasonable for the offender. The attempt is to achieve the conditions, otherwise the prosecutors could have defaulted in the first place to criminal proceedings. They do not want them and therefore it is about wanting those conditions to work. That is what the thrust of all the agencies working together will be.
 If unreasonable conditions are offered that would make it impossible for the offender to agree, he can say, ''This isn't reasonable and I don't agree to them.'' Then it would be for the prosecutors to decide whether they agreed with the offender and to go to an ordinary caution, or whether the default position should be to go to criminal prosecution. It could go either way.

Paul Stinchcombe: I wonder how it could go either way, as a condition would have to be satisfied that there was insufficient evidence to charge the offender with the offence before the conditional caution could be suggested.

Harriet Harman: The conditional caution is suggested when there is sufficient evidence to charge. The first part of the procedure takes place when the police are satisfied that there is enough evidence and they send it to the Crown Prosecution Service, which is also satisfied that there is enough evidence. It will be only for cases where it is an actual possibility, not a theoretical one. The Crown Prosecution Service will need to be satisfied that both tests have been met under the code of the Crown prosecutors: whether there is enough evidence and whether it is in the public interest.
 In respect of keeping the conditions reasonable, first, the good will will try to make them reasonable, because the emphasis is to try to succeed; secondly, the failsafe is that if the conditions are unreasonable, the offender need not agree to them. 
 The hon. Member for Beaconsfield made an interesting point about the wording. Because conditional cautioning is a new concept, this part of the Bill is remarkably free from the problems identified by my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham, North: it does not refer to thousands of other provisions but stands on its own. On a couple of readings, it more or less does what it says it is going to do. It looks refreshingly different from the rest of the Bill. Some of the language is different. It is much more like that sought by my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham, North; ''facilitating'', for example, is not found in other parts of the Bill. 
 The hon. Member for Beaconsfield was concerned that ''ensuring'' is an unrealistic term. It is on the extremely optimistic end, but it represents the spirit in which the provision was introduced.

Dominic Grieve: I do not want to pre-empt the Minister. I accept that amendment No. 123 would remove the word ''facilitating''. There is no need for that; we could just take out the word ''ensuring'' and use the phrase ''facilitating and helping towards'' or some other expression. I am not trying to be prescriptive. The word ''ensuring'' is over-optimistic, as the right hon. and learned Lady accepts. We should try to use language that reflects reality. However, I agree with her that it is refreshingly new text. I am not trying to move back to old-fashioned jargon; I am trying to find something that properly reflects what Parliament is trying to achieve.

Paul Stinchcombe: I was grateful for the correction of my previous intervention. Would it not be easier to delete the phrase ''ensuring or facilitating''. The object is rehabilitation.

Harriet Harman: I accept that it is rather unusual language. I accept that ''ensuring'' is a higher order or aspiration than we would normally use in legislation. However, I would not want to say, once the Committee has completed its consideration, that although we all thought that it was a good idea we know that we cannot ensure anything—we have been in Parliament too long to think that legislation could ever be as good as we might originally have hoped—and that we have therefore downgraded it. I agree that ''ensuring'' is a bit over the top, but I would not like to send the message that we would not attempt to ensure it. It is mitigated by ''facilitating''.
 I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his amendments, and I thank him for the effective drafting, which he has been doing for years to great effect. However, I think that I will pass on this occasion. 
 The hon. Member for North Down asked whether it will be made clear to offenders that if they do not comply with the conditions they may face prosecution.

Lady Hermon: On that very point, I want offenders to be warned that the piece of paper that they sign, on which they admit that they have committed an offence, will be used in evidence against them if criminal proceedings are to follow. It is not only about the failure to comply with the conditions. It is more like an inducement. It is almost as if they are told, ''If you sign this paper, you will not go to court.'' They need to
 know that when they sign that paper it will be used in criminal proceedings should the case go that far.

Harriet Harman: The hon. Lady's point is about ensuring that the seriousness of the conditions is recognised; if people do not comply, they may well end up going to court. The fifth requirement, described in clause 19(5), is that the offender signs a document that must contain details of the offence, an admission that the person committed the offence, his consent to the caution and the conditions attached to the caution. However, it would probably be helpful to print on the back of that pro forma what would happen if they did not comply. That is a useful suggestion.

Ian Lucas: I am a little concerned about what would happen to an individual who did not make an admission in the initial interview at the police station but whose case was subsequently referred to the Crown Prosecution Service, which suggested a conditional caution. In those circumstances, it would be appropriate for the potential defendant to have legal advice; but the Bill makes no provision for that. That advice would be available at the police station, and I wonder whether my right hon. and learned Friend can give me some form of assurance that, in such circumstances, a potential defendant would be given the opportunity to take legal advice.

Harriet Harman: My hon. Friend makes an important point. It is a serious matter, and later amendments go into that in more detail. I hope that the assurance that I shall be able to give at that time will make it absolutely clear. It is not intended that people who should, but do not, have legal advice, or who do not get the option of legal advice, should make admissions about criminal offences when, in contrast to what happens with a simple caution, their admission could lead to prosecution. I take that point, and that is not the intention and it will not happen. It is important that people do not agree to cautions without thinking the matter through properly, but at least in the case of a caution the matter is dealt with. The point about conditional cautions is that an admission could become admissible as evidence.
 I hope that I have dealt satisfactorily with the matter of keeping both the restorative and rehabilitative principles—to which amendment No. 113 relates; with our intention to retain our aspiration and our trendy facilitating language, which means that we do not accept amendment No. 123; with our not breaching the Witney principles by having to specify everything in the code of practice; and with our not accepting amendment No. 141, in case people should think that they are out of the system, as they would be with a simple caution. If people do not comply with a conditional caution, they may be prosecuted.

Simon Hughes: I am persuaded by the Solicitor-General's argument about amendment No. 141, and agree that we must be careful that people do not regard a conditional caution as an escape. It should be regarded as a conditional next phase, in which two possible routes are open.
 I am less persuaded about amendment No. 142, although I shall not push it to a vote. I remain concerned that we need certainty, but I understand the 
 right hon. and learned Lady's point about the need for flexibility. I shall reflect on the matter to decide whether we need to return to it. No doubt the hon. Member for Beaconsfield is thinking of ways of pursuing the points that he made earlier. We listen with an attitude of wanting to encourage good aspirations as well as wanting to get things right. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Dominic Grieve: I beg to move amendment No.112, in
clause 18, page 13, line 11, leave out '18' and insert '16'.
 The amendment is simple. The scheme is so good that I wonder whether it should be applied to 16-year-olds. Are there problems that would prevent it from being applied to them? At no stage is reparation and rehabilitation more desirable than when the people involved are young. I should be interested to know why 18 has been chosen as the starting point for this approach.

Harriet Harman: The starting age of 18 was chosen because of the reprimands and final warning system. We do not want to arrive at a state of affairs in which for the under-16s there are reprimands and final warnings, for 16 to 18-year-olds there are both reprimands and final warnings and the new conditional cautions, and for those aged 18 or over there is conditional cautioning.
 To introduce conditional cautions for those aged 16 we should probably need to get rid of reprimands and final warnings for that age group, so that those up to 16 would be given reprimands and final warnings, and those aged 16 or over would receiving conditional cautioning. It is probably a good idea not to proliferate in this regard, although there is a degree of proliferation anyway. I do not want to give the Committee the impression that matters are simpler than they really are. Things are already quite complicated. We do not want to complicate matters much further with the new measure.

Dominic Grieve: I aim to keep my remarks short, because there are more matters that we want to cover, but I ask the Solicitor-General to keep an open mind about whether, for 16-year-olds, conditional cautions might be a better mechanism than reprimands and final warnings. That is what I had in mind. Conditional cautions could be an effective method of dealing with crime, and much better than what we now have for juveniles.

Harriet Harman: It would be good to think that that would improve on reprimands and final warnings, which have already been quite useful. I think that the provisions will be rolled out, and perhaps even piloted and formally evaluated during that process. The clause gives the legal basis for conditional cautioning. However, that does not necessarily mean that conditional cautioning will be immediately introduced nationally. It will emerge at different speeds in different areas. The inspectorates and the Government will evaluate the rolling out. It would be a good idea for joint inspection by Her Majesty's inspectorate of police and Her Majesty's inspectorate
 of the Crown Prosecution Service, which will no doubt consider that. The scheme might be better than, or overtake, something else. One does not want to close off any options: if some people in some areas regard the reprimands and final warnings as useful, one would be reluctant to abolish them.
 There is also an argument for simplicity—for people to know what the system is. I do not want to offer to abolish the reprimands and final warnings in advance, but I take the hon. Member for Beaconsfield's point that when we are adding things, we should sometimes take things away, in order to avoid a thicket of options that creates confusion. We want to have enough options for there to be a good choice, but without confusion. I am glad about the optimism expressed in the amendment, but although I take his point, I do not accept the amendment.

Dominic Grieve: I am grateful for the Solicitor-General's comments, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Dominic Grieve: I beg to move amendment No.118, in
clause 18, page 13, leave out lines 21 and 22.

Eric Illsley: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments:
 No. 114, in 
clause 18, page 13, line 21, leave out 'a constable' and insert 
 'an officer of the rank of chief inspector or above'.
 No. 115, in 
clause 18, page 13, leave out line 22.

Dominic Grieve: We now continue the theme about the importance of the procedure, in terms of the defendant's full understanding at the police station of the consequences of accepting a conditional caution. The amendments should not be thought of in isolation: they are part of a package of amendments designed to emphasise the importance of the issue. That is particularly so as the person in question may subsequently be prosecuted and the conditional caution used as evidence against them.
 The amendments are designed to consider whether an authorised person should be more senior than a constable or an investigating officer. Their other purpose is to ensure that proper decisions are taken in terms of the conditions that are attached. How does the Solicitor-General see the provisions working in practice? Is she satisfied that the level of the authorised person is sufficient for the decisions required under the five requirements of clause 19?

Harriet Harman: Yes, I am satisfied. The hon. Gentleman's amendments and comments have raised two points. Will matters be properly explained and made clear? I hope that clause 19(4), which requires an explanation to be given, will deal with that. Moreover, clause 19(5) requires the explanation to be in writing. That is quite clear. In clause 19(4) and (5), we hope that we have dealt with the aspect of the amendment that probes whether sufficient information will be given with enough gravitas. If the amendments
 concern the level of seniority at which decisions are made, perhaps I shall reassure him by reminding him that the decision about whether there will be a conditional caution is not the police's, but that of the Crown Prosecution Service. Therefore, it is the reviewing lawyer who will decide whether there is sufficient evidence to prosecute and whether to do so is in the public interest. The police do the administering, but that is done orally and then backed up in writing.

Simon Hughes: Suppose the clause as drafted were passed and I was the recipient of a conditional caution from a police constable. Would I have to say that the Crown Prosecution Service had given me that caution? Would it be understood that the decision was not that of the police officer or the investigating officer but that of the Crown Prosecution Service? There must not be confusion that a copper on the beat made the decision.

Harriet Harman: The hon. Gentleman raises an important point, because the clause does not actually specify. That will have to be considered when the code of practice is being drawn up. From where the caution emanates is not on the list of measures to be included in the code. Whether the form of words is, ''This is a caution from the Crown Prosecution Service, which in this instance is deciding not to prosecute you even though it can, and if you breach these conditions I will be sending it back to the Crown Prosecution Service,'' or, ''I am administering this caution to you and here are the conditions, and this is what will happen to you if you don't comply,'' the point raised is not addressed. However, I shall ask for it to be considered for inclusion in the code of practice.
 The Secretary of State will draw up the code of practice, but it cannot be published without the consent of the Attorney-General, who superintends the Crown Prosecution Service. It must then be laid before both Houses. I anticipate many of the points that hon. Members have helpfully raised will emerge in the code of practice, when people will have another opportunity to discuss the matter.

Dominic Grieve: I am grateful to the Solicitor-General for her reassurances. As the next amendment is more important, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 18 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 19 - The five requirements

Dominic Grieve: I beg to move amendment No. 126, in
clause 19, page 13, line 33, after 'admits', insert 'having taken or refused to take legal advice'.

Eric Illsley: With this it will be convenient to take the following amendments: No. 143, in
clause 19, page 13, line 33, after 'admits', insert 'freely'.
 No. 119, in 
clause 19, page 13, line 39, after 'that', insert ', after being offered the opportunity of receiving legal advice,'.
 No. 120, in 
clause 20, page 14, leave out lines 7 and 8.

Dominic Grieve: We now come to the absolute nub of the five requirements, which is the question whether the person has had legal advice at the time that he consents to being given a conditional caution. It may be implicit that that will happen, but the nature of the procedure is such that it should be made explicit.
 I am aware that I am running out of time, so I shall make just two points: it is no fault of the Government Whip, but the way in which we have structured this Committee has left us with insufficient time to discuss not only conditional cautions under part 3 but the charging conditions under part 4, in which there are many important points that require attention yet will simply not be considered. Rather than making a point of order, Mr. Illsley, I simply want to say how much I regret that. We must focus on the key issue of legal advice. I shall pass over all the other amendments in exchange for a response.

Harriet Harman: I am grateful to have the opportunity to assure the Committee that a suspect, under section 58 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, will have had access to legal advice. That is very important.
 Furthermore, I welcome the hon. Gentleman's suggestion that he regards the Bill's charging provisions as important. Many people believe that the charging changes are the most important changes in practice. I will continue to give him and his colleagues as much information about it as I can. I hope that we will find another opportunity to debate this, perhaps on Report or in the other place. It is entirely new; it is a big and, I hope, a beneficial change. I, too, regret that I am unable to debate the charging changes. 
 Yes, it must be a free admission, but I do not think that we need to add ''freely'' as suggested in amendment No. 143. It is implicit; if it was not free it would be wrong. As for amendment No. 126, there must be an option for legal advice. If— 
 It being twenty-five minutes past Eleven o'clock, The Chairman proceeded to put forthwith the Question already proposed from the Chair. 
 Amendment negatived. 
 The Chairman then proceeded to put forthwith the Questions necessary to dispose of the business to be concluded at that time. 
 Clauses 19 to 23 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 2 - Charging or release of persons in police detention

Amendments made: No.154, in 
schedule 2, page 154, line 11, leave out 'but on bail' and insert 
 'and on bail for the purpose of enabling the Director of Public Prosecutions to make a decision under section 37B below'.
 No. 155, in 
schedule 2, page 154, line 11, at end insert— 
 '(b) shall be released without charge and on bail but not for that purpose,'.
 No. 156, in 
schedule 2, page 154, line 12, leave out '(b)' and insert '(c)'.
 No. 157, in 
schedule 2, page 154, line 13, leave out '(c)' and insert '(d)'
 No. 158, in 
schedule 2, page 154, line 15, after '(7A)' insert— 
 'The decision as to how a person is to be dealt with under subsection (7) above shall be that of the custody officer. 
 (7B)'. 
 No. 159, in 
schedule 2, page 154, line 17, leave out 'the decisions mentioned in' and insert 'a decision under'.
 No. 160, in 
schedule 2, page 154, line 18, at end insert— 
 '(4) In subsection (8)(a) after ''(7)(b)'' there is inserted ''or (c)''.'.
 No. 161, in 
schedule 2, page 154, line 21, leave out from 'guidance' to end of line 23 and insert— 
 '(a) for the purpose of enabling custody officers to decide how persons should be dealt with under section 37(7) above or 37C(2) below, and 
 (b) as to the information to be sent to the Director of Public Prosecutions under section 37B(1) below.'.
 No. 162, in 
schedule 2, page 154, line 27, leave out 
 'determining what action to take' 
 and insert 
 'deciding how persons should be dealt with'.
 No. 163, in 
schedule 2, page 154, line 27, at end insert 'or 37C(2) below'.
 No. 164, in 
schedule 2, page 155, line 5, leave out from 'may' to end of line 6 and insert 
 'be specified in guidance under section 37A above'.
 No. 165, in 
schedule 2, page 155, line 33, leave out subsection (8).
 No. 166, in 
schedule 2, page 156, line 4, at end insert 
 'in respect of that bail'.
 No. 167, in 
schedule 2, page 156, line 10, leave out from 'charged' to 'or' in line 11.
 No. 168, in 
Schedule 2, page 156, line 14, leave out subsections (3) to (5) and insert— 
 '(3) The decision as to how a person is to be dealt with under subsection (2) above shall be that of a custody officer.'.
 No. 169, in 
schedule 2, page 156, line 36, after 'may' insert 'subsequently'.
 No. 170, in 
schedule 2, page 156, line 41, leave out subsection (3).
 No. 171, in 
schedule 2, page 157, line 4, leave out 'the' and insert 'a'.
 No. 172, in 
schedule 2, page 157, line 4, leave out from 'is' to 'he' in line 6 and insert 
 'otherwise in police detention at a police station'.
 No. 173, in 
schedule 2, page 157, line 11, at end insert— 
 '(7) Where a person is kept in police detention by virtue of subsection (5) or (6) above, section 37(1) to (3) and (7) above (and section 40(8) below so far as it relates to section 37(1) to (3)) shall not apply to the offence in connection with which he was released on bail under section 37(7)(a) or 37C(2)(b) above.'
 No. 174, in 
schedule 2, page 157, line 11, at end insert— 
 '3A In section 40 (review of police detention) in subsection (9) after ''37(9)'' there is inserted ''or 37D(6) above''.'
 No. 175, in 
schedule 2, page 157, line 24, after ' ''section'' ' insert 
 ', in the first place where it occurs,'.
 No. 176, in 
schedule 2, page 157, line 29, leave out '(1G)' and insert '(1F)'.
 No. 177, in 
schedule 2, page 157, line 32, leave out from 'make' to 'an' in line 33.—[Ms Harman.]
 Schedule 2, as amended, agreed to. 
 Clause 24 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 25 - Further provision about new method

Amendments made: No.179, in 
clause 25, page 16, line 8, at end insert— 
 '(1A) Without limiting subsection (1), the provision which may be made by virtue of that subsection includes provision— 
 (a) which applies (with or without modifications), or which disapplies, the provision of any enactment relating to the service of documents, 
 (b) for or in connection with the issue of further requisitions.'
 No. 180, in 
clause 25, page 16, line 9, after '(1)' insert 'or (1A)'.
 No. 181, in 
clause 25, page 16, line 21, leave out from 'expressed)' to 'an' in line 22 and insert 
 'which is or includes a reference to an information within the meaning of section 1 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 (c.43) (or to the laying of such'.
 No. 182, in 
clause 25, page 16, line 24, after 'expressed)' insert 
 'which is or includes a reference'.
 No. 183, in 
clause 25, page 16, line 27, leave out 'an authorised individual' and insert 'a public prosecutor'.
 No. 184, in 
clause 25, page 16, line 27, at end insert— 
 '(4A) The reference in subsection (4) to an enactment contained in an Act passed before this Act includes a reference to an enactment contained in that Act as a result of an amendment to that Act made by this Act or by any other Act passed in the same Session as this Act.'—[Ms Harman.]
 Clause 25, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 26 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Adjourned at twenty-seven minutes past Eleven o'clock till this day at half-past Two o'clock.